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FirstEnergy Needs You To Toss Them a Rope

1/12/2017

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Awwww.... FirstEnergy had a bad year in 2016.
"There's blood in the water," Jones said in an October interview.

He added, "We've reduced benefits, we've reduced 401(k) matches, we froze wages. We've done a lot of things to try and offset lost revenue, but couldn't offset it entirely … We're evaluating everything we do as a company to try and find a way to close that gap. Because (what's been done so far) is not enough to get us into the position with the credit rating agencies that we need to be in."
And I'm sure Chatty Chuck took a huge pay cut and stopped wasting the company's profits on football stadium signage, too.  Wait!  What?  That didn't happen?

Well, there always selling another antique coal-fired electric generating station to captive customers in West Virginia!  I'm pretty sure they're going to try that next as a way to position themselves properly with the credit rating agencies.  Because even though FirstEnergy's money problems were of their own making, they want West Virginians to bail them out.  Again.
Pleasants, currently owned by a Mon Power sister company, Allegheny Energy Supply, is an aging, coal-fired plant that hasn’t been generating the returns investors want in Ohio’s deregulated energy marketplace. FirstEnergy CEO Charles E. Jones, on at least two occasions in 2016, told analysts the company wanted to shift plants like Pleasants that weren’t making investors enough money in Ohio into West Virginia’s regulated market, saying, “I think later this year, they’ll start (looking) at it seriously, and it’s up to (the West Virginia Public Service Commission) to decide, would Pleasants be the appropriate solution.”
And so that's what they did, issuing a narrow and completely opague Request for Proposals that could only be fulfilled by the sale of Pleasants to West Virginia regulated FirstEnergy subsidiaries Mon Power and Potomac Edison.  Once the transaction is completed, electric customers of the two local utilities will pay all the operational costs of the plant, along with a guaranteed profit.  That ought to cheer up the credit rating agencies, right?

Well, only if it happens.  Only if you allow it to happen.  What can you do?  Stay educated.  Stay tuned... 
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Santa Stuffs FirstEnergy's Stocking Full of Serendipity

12/22/2016

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After a year of telling investment wonks that it was planning to sell another one of its unprofitable coal-fired power plants to one of its regulated affiliates, while telling everyone else it didn't need any new generation capacity, FirstEnergy gifted itself with a big ol' sack of serendipity last Friday.

FirstEnergy's Mon Power subsidiary issued a Request for Proposals to acquire 1,300 MW of generation capacity, and 100 MW of demand respone.

Serendipity!  The Pleasants power station that FirstEnergy's competitive generation affiliate wants to "sell" to Mon Power is exactly 1,300 MW!  It's like some divine power has spoken!

I'm not sure whose gift that 100 MW of demand response is supposed to be, but maybe it was designed to placate someone?  Demand response is an aggregated group of power customers who agree to cut their usage during periods of high demand in exchange for payments.  So, why not 1,300 MW of demand response and 100 MW of generation?  Why not 100 MW of demand response and a 1,300 MW power purchase agreement from an economical regional generation source?  Why must we buy the cow, when the milk is available cheaply at the market?

Anyhow, Mon Power also limited its RFP to resources in a small geographic area.  Serendipity!  Pleasants is located in that geographic area!

And after talking about this "sale" and the issuance of an RFP for months, Mon Power issues its RFP on December 16 and allows one week for eligible resources to "pre-qualify" to submit a bid later?  Be sure to get your pack of pre-qualifying paperwork in by close of business on December 23, or you won't be able to bid later and there will be no Merry Christmas for you!  Bah!  Humbug!

Seriously?  They expect everyone to believe they didn't issue this RFP so close to the holidays, with a ridiculously short lead time, in order to limit any competition with the company's own resources?  I'm sure FirstEnergy's Allegheny Energy Supply Company has its paperwork all ready to be submitted... the rest of you?  Yeah, you need to start from scratch.  Right now.

So, why should you care?  Because the last coal-fired power station that FirstEnergy "sold" to Mon Power has cost you more than $130 so far.  Each.  You've gifted FirstEnergy more than $160M, but they still want more.

FirstEnergy is in big financial trouble, and they want you to bail them out of their bad business decisions.

And they arrogantly thumb their nose at customers, competitors, and regulators alike with their serendipitous RFP.  They must think this is a funny game, but uncompetitive RFPs can get companies in lots and lots of trouble.

What can you do in the mean time?  Why don't you ask Mon Power a question, such as why their RFP is so ridiculously unfair?  Or ask if Scrooge helped them with their response dates?

FirstEnergy doesn't even care how bad they look.  I guess they think they have this in the bag.  Stay tuned, pitckfork wielders...
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Jim Justice's Rocket Ride to Higher Electric Rates

12/7/2016

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Transition teams... landing teams... 24 clowns in a VW Beetle who are subject matter experts, who hasn't heard enough of this nonsense yet?

Sorry.  I'm really sorry I feel compelled to actually write about a "transition team."  But I guess that's what happens when we elect buffoons to public office.  Well, let me revise that... when YOU elect buffoons to public office.  My hands are clean.

Yesterday, West Virginia Governor-elect Jim Justice announced his "transition team."  It's a list filled with corporate interests.  You voters are not on Jim's team.
"This is about getting the best and brightest in the same room to share their ideas for taking West Virginia on a rocket ride to the top."
I'll assume that's a rocket ride to the top of all the bad lists, such as the cost of electricity.  Thanks a bunch, Jim!

Jim surely likes his rocket rides.  Google "Jim Justice + Rocket Ride" and you'll find that he's been riding his rocket all over the place in the past few months.  Must be one hell of a rocket, carrying a big guy like Jim all over like that.

But it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out why Jim named former FirstEnergy CEO Tony Alexander to his scheme team.  Mr. and Mrs. Tony Alexander of Akron, Ohio, have historically been very, very concerned about the state of political affairs in West Virginia.  Do you think that someday, hopefully, we may be good enough for them to actually live here and be buffeted by the consequences of their own political dabbling?

Oh, my, look who contributed to Big Jim's gubernatorial campaign!
Aug 17, 2016       
Becky S. Alexander
2936 Ironwood Dr
Akron OH 44312-5809
Contributor's job: homemaker
Where contributor works: self
 $1,000.00

Aug 17, 2016     
Anthony J Alexander, Sr
2936 Ironwood Dr
Akron OH 44312-5809
Contributor's job: Executive Chairman
Where contributor works: First Energy
$1,000.00
Wow, you're a pretty cheap date for a rich guy, Jim.  In fact, I could almost afford you myself.  But you're a fashion accessory I don't need. I don't think you'd go with my outfit... ever.

So, Tony the Trickster (and here I thought I'd have to give up that rather delicious nickname when he retired) listed his job as "Executive Chairman" of FirstEnergy.  Except FirstEnergy's list of its Board of Directors no longer includes his grimacing mug.

Whose interests does Tony represent as part of Jim's rocket team?  Does he still represent FirstEnergy's interests?  Or does he simply represent his own interests?  I'm pretty sure he still owns a sack full of FirstEnergy stock that he was awarded in compensation for his piloting of FirstEnergy's rocket down the highway to hell for a number of years.  Is FirstEnergy paying him for his time spent advising Big Jim?  Or is he a free agent, simply volunteering his time as a community service to a community in which he would never deign to reside?

But I'm sure our rocket will get some great polish from Tony the Trickster!  He's the one who bought up Allegheny Energy's antique coal fleet, then tried to be a merchant generator and dabble in customer choice markets until his FirstEnergy Solutions subsidiary nearly went broke.  I'm certain FirstEnergy was terribly sorry to see him retire before he reached age 65, and never would have considered jettisoning him due to fears that he would bankrupt the entire company before he left.

He's Tony the Trickster!  He's everyone's best pal!

This is like a classic horror flick... just when you think the monster has been vanquished he pops out of the closet and
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WV PSC Follows Utility Lead

10/28/2016

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It's really not surprising that our West Virginia Public Service Commissioners continue to fail at leading utilities to act in the best interest of the state's consumers.  In a state where Public Service Commission appointments are looked at as political favors, an ill-informed and uninspired regulator continues to march to the beat of utility profits.

Recently, the WV PSC dismissed a petition filed by its own staff and the WV Consumer Advocate to require electric utilities Mon Power and Potomac Edison to issue a Request for Proposals before buying another generator from its parent company in an intimate and opaque non-arm's-length transaction.

The WV PSC found the petition "premature" because the companies have not yet filed an action to purchase more generation.

The PSC previously rejected a motion by the same parties to require the companies to issue an RFP for new generation it claimed would be needed in its Integrated Resource Plan last year.

The PSC contends that the requirement to file an Integrated Resource Plan does not allow the PSC to approve or reject a utility's plan, therefore it must powerlessly follow a utility's lead.  The PSC also contends that the companies' promise to issue an RFP for new generation that was part of its settlement in the case that allowed its last inter-company purchase of generation has not been triggered.  The WV PSC sits trussed up on the floor like a prisoner, unable and unwilling to act in the best interests of West Virginia's electric consumers, completely useless.

It's word soup and double standards that has the PSC ineffectually sitting on their hands.  The last time the companies needed to purchase generation in an internal transaction (Harrison), they claimed there just wasn't time to issue an RFP because the need was way too urgent.  If that was the case, then the utilities had not planned correctly.  The settlement that allowed the purchase of Harrison required:
If the Companies determine in any annual PJM Base Residual Auction (“BRA”) that their combined capacity obligations for the delivery year covered by the BRA (“Delivery Year”) exceed the Companies’ owned or contracted-for capacity resources for the Delivery Year by 100 MW or more (“Capacity Shortfall”), then not later than the end of the calendar year following the BRA, the Companies will develop an RFP for capacity resources to address the Capacity Shortfall and submit the RFP to the Commission and the Parties for their review and comment. The RFP will allow proposals from both supply-side and demand-side resources.
Everyone hoped that the companies would honor this commitment.

However, the companies turned around and filed an Integrated Resource Plan contending a generation shortfall.  In that filing, the companies used a different method to calculate the shortfall that did not depend on PJM's Base Residual Auction.
Mon Power’s Long Term Load Forecast indicates a capacity shortfall starting in 2016, with the shortfall exceeding 700 MW by 2020 and extending to over 850 MW by 2027.
While PJM's auction may not require the companies to acquire more generation, the companies used a different method to calculate a shortfall, and then claimed that it was not required to issue an RFP because PJM's auction didn't indicate the same shortfall.

And the WV PSC let them get away with it!  If the PSC wants to use the companies' method to calculate generation needs, then it should never have approved the settlement stipulation that used PJM's method.  Conversely, if the PSC approved the stipulation that used PJM's method for calculating generation needs, then it should never have allowed the companies to use a different method in its Integrated Resource Plan.  They simply can't have it both ways!  Either they have a generation shortfall, or they don't.  The WV PSC needs to quit dithering and sitting on its hands.

FirstEnergy has made it perfectly clear that it intends to make Mon Power and Potomac Edison purchase the Pleasants power station.
We will continue to seek opportunities both within the competitive realm and the states to further de-risk the business and convert megawatts from competitive markets to a regulated or regulated-like construct.

We also plan to work with the West Virginia Public Service Commission when they are ready to address the generation shortfall included in Mon Power's integrated resource plan.

So we previously filed the IRP. It showed a need for generation going out a couple of years from now. But that case right now is concluded. So there is nothing that would, unless we were to file something, initiate something, that would come out of that case. So we would be looking as we go forward and continue to monitor the forecast for that company to see how we might want to present something consistent with the IRP in terms of bringing additional generation to Mon Power.

Michael Lapides - Goldman Sachs & Co.

Got it. So there's no formal like RFP process that's about to kick off or that will be undertaken in 2016 or 2017?

Leila L. Vespoli - Executive Vice President, Markets & Chief Legal Officer

Correct. There's no time line associated with that. We would initiate it when we believe it to be the appropriate time.
FirstEnergy management arrogantly tells its investors that it alone controls the timeline in which the WV PSC may examine its upcoming request to have Mon Power and Potomac Edison purchase more generation from the parent company.  Only FirstEnergy will decide when the time is appropriate to create another "urgent need" that the PSC must approve without initiating a fair and transparent competitive process.

The WV PSC needs to stop behaving like FirstEnergy's dog on a leash and start doing its job as a regulator tasked with balancing public and private interests to effectively serve the state's consumers.  Maybe the political appointees at the PSC need to find out what their job actually entails?  I think they all need to read this book.
The decisive regulator makes decisions (1) required by the public interest, (2) when the public interest requires it, (3) regardless of discomfort felt, (4) using a logical method and an active approach.
As long as the WV PSC continues to behave like a lapdog, FirstEnergy will continue to toss West Virginians under the bus for benefit of its company and investors.
At this time, however, we do not see any short-term solutions to the current challenging market situation. Longer-term, we do not believe competitive generation is a good fit for FirstEnergy and are focused regulated operations. And we cannot put investors and our company at risk as we wait for the country and PJM to address the issues with the current construct.
Our PSC should be refusing to put West Virginians at risk!  Let's hope they figure out what it is they're supposed to be doing before we're stuck with another costly, outdated generator.
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FirstEnergy Self-Dealing Scheme Not In The Best Interest of Potomac Edison/Mon Power Customers

9/22/2016

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...so sayeth "The P3 Group," aka PJM Power Providers Group, a non-profit group of competitive energy providers in the PJM region collectively owning over 84,000 megawatts of generation assets.  P3 is joined by the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), a national power providers' trade association.

These two groups popped up with a comment this week in the West Virginia Public Service Commission case regarding the issuance of a Request for Proposals for additional power supply for FirstEnergy's Mon Power and Potomac Edison subsidiaries.

The power providers say that the PSC has the authority to require FirstEnergy to issue an RFP for additional supply, and that only an RFP will ensure that Potomac Edison and Mon Power customers get the best price for new generation.
The best and most appropriate manner for this Commission to fully examine potential supply options would be with the use of a broad, competitively neutral RFP in which multiple suppliers could actively compete to meet the needs of West Virginia consumers. This would ensure that all available supply-side and demand-side resources are transparently reviewed in accordance with the state’s applicable rules and laws.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that soliciting competitive bids for power will produce the lowest cost.  But if you're FirstEnergy, you don't care about costs for West Virginia electric customers, you only care about your holding company's balance sheet and stock price.

The power providers quoted a research paper prepared by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as support for an RFP:
The first key issue for incremental resource procurements is the design of safeguards to prevent potential improper self-dealing by the utility. Because the utility may financially benefit from the selection of its own self-build offer or a proposal from an affiliate, safeguards are necessary to ensure that the process is not improperly tilted toward the selection of such offers.
The power providers join the West Virginia Consumer Advocate Division, the Staff of the Public Service Commission, WV Citizen Action Group, WV SUN, and West Virginia Energy Users Group in calling on the Public Service Commission to order FirstEnergy and its subsidiaries to issue and RFP that will definitively and transparently determine the cheapest resource for adding additional capacity.

What is it FirstEnergy is trying to hide with its opaque self-dealing insistence that the purchase of one of FirstEnergy's own resources is a "good deal" for West Virginians?  Sunshine is the best disinfectant!
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FirstEnergy's Coal Plant Purchase Has Cost You $130 Since 2013

9/20/2016

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That's according to a recent report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).

Back in 2013, FirstEnergy, parent company of West Virginia distribution electric utilities Mon Power and Potomac Edison, came up with a bright idea to sell the Harrison Power Station to itself in order to raise cash to shore up its sagging balance sheet.  The plant was originally owned by FirstEnergy's competitive electricity supply company, Allegheny Energy Supply.  When owned by Allegheny Energy Supply, the plant was required to cover its own operating costs and make any profits by selling electricity into regional markets at a cost higher than its costs to produce the power.  However, market prices for electricity began falling due to the glut of cheaper gas-fired generators, making it harder and harder for Harrison to compete and turn a profit.  FirstEnergy proposed that Allegheny Energy Supply "sell" the plant to its West Virginia distribution affiliates at a jacked up price.  Once Mon Power and Potomac Edison owned the plant, their ratepayers would cover the cost of operating the plant, with electricity sold to the power market at going rates.  Except the going rate for power not only didn't produce any profit for the company's ratepayers, it didn't even cover its own operating costs.  Therefore, ratepayers of Mon Power and Potomac Edison have been subsidizing the cost of operating the plant at a loss since 2013.  The IEEFA estimates that the bill for ratepayers has climbed to $164 million.  That equals roughly $130 in extra electric bill charges for every customer of Mon Power and Potomac Edison, paid to cover the losses of operating the Harrison Power Station.

The IEEFA calculated the costs by using monthly reports of operating costs and market prices submitted to the Public Service Commission since 2013.  The IEEFA report reveals that the plant has produced a net cost (not benefit) to ratepayers for 28 out of 33 months.  And future prospects for the plant turning a profit remain dim.

FirstEnergy "still believes the plant is still a good deal for customers in West Virginia."
Todd Meyers, a spokesperson for MonPower, responded to questions about the study by saying the company believes the purchase benefits their customers and that it supports coal mining.

“It continues to provide reliable, low-cost power to our customers, and has preserved the opportunity to use more than 5 million tons of West Virginia produced coal annually, supporting hundreds of coal miners with solid, family-sustaining wages,” he said.
No word on whether Meyers still believes in Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy as well, but I recently bumped into a leprechaun riding a unicorn and he told me that he does.

What are customers of Mon Power and Potomac Edison paying for?  Are they paying for the electricity they use, or are they paying to subsidize the coal industry?  Or are they instead simply subsidizing FirstEnergy's quarterly dividends paid to shareholders?

And guess what?  FirstEnergy has recently proposed selling ANOTHER of its competitive coal plants to Mon Power and Potomac Edison, citing the "model" of Harrison as the basis for another "good deal for customers in West Virginia."  We can't afford another one of FirstEnergy's "good deals!"

Heads up, West Virginians, we're going to need all hands on deck to stop this one!
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FirstEnergy Scheme to Pass Risk to West Virginians

8/6/2016

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It's a risk hot potato.  While some states have deregulated electricity generation, others have not.  This makes for two different economic schemes for power plants.  In the deregulated scenario, plants compete with each other to sell power in electric markets.  A deregulated plant's income is derived from what it earns.  Earnings minus the cost of producing power equals profit.  But a regulated plant comes with a guaranteed profit.  Regulation takes the place of a competitive market to guarantee a generator a fair return (but no more).  A regulated plant is guaranteed to collect its cost of producing power, plus a fair return, to generate a set amount of profit.

When power market prices are high, deregulated plants earn more, because there is no regulated cap on the amount they can earn.  However, when power market prices are low, regulated plants earn more, because they are guaranteed to earn a certain amount over their cost of service.

A deregulated plant must cover its own operation costs, everything it earns above its cost to produce power is profit.  The owner of the plant shoulders all the risk of operating a plant that doesn't produce adequate profit.  If a plant cannot produce adequate profit, it fails economically and will likely close.

A regulated plant's operation costs are covered by ratepayers.  If the plant fails to produce an adequate profit margin, it can continue to operate because it is guaranteed to collect its operating costs and a small profit from ratepayers.  The ratepayers shoulder all risk of operating a plant that doesn't produce adequate profit.  It cannot fail economically because the ratepayers are there to make up any shortfalls between the cost to produce power, and the market price of that power.

It's all about who shoulders the economic risk. 

FirstEnergy used to love deregulated plants when power prices were high.  FirstEnergy made huge profits.  But then power prices started falling because generators that were cheaper to operate entered the market.  FirstEnergy's plants use coal for fuel.  New plants use cheaper natural gas for fuel.  Suddenly, FirstEnergy's deregulated coal-fired plants weren't economic any longer and couldn't cover their operating costs and still generate a profit.  In a pure market situation, these plants would close.  However, FirstEnergy has been looking for ways to transfer their deregulated plants into a regulated system, so they can continue to operate at a loss, courtesy of electric ratepayers.  FirstEnergy wants to transfer its risk from the company to ratepayers.
“We cannot put investors and our company at risk.”
So said FirstEnergy CEO Chatty Chuck Jones during a conference with the company's stockholders.  The company is planning to transfer its unprofitable Pleasants coal-fired plant into West Virginia's regulated system so that the company no longer has any risk associated with owning it.

If it's too risky for FirstEnergy's shareholders, it's too risky for West Virginia consumers.  We simply cannot afford to shoulder more risk for the Ohio power conglomerate.  Several years ago, FirstEnergy was successful in transferring its failing Harrison Power Station into West Virginia's regulated system.  West Virginians are now paying above-market prices to operate it, and sell excess power into the regional market.  Electric bills increased to cover the cost of owning and operating the plant (and paying for a whole bunch of maintenance on the plant that FirstEnergy deferred because the plant was losing money), plus a guaranteed profit for FirstEnergy.

Late last year, FirstEnergy filed its Integrated Resource Plan with the WV Public Service Commission.  The IRP is a long-range plan by the company detailing how it plans to acquire the generation resources necessary to meet the needs of West Virginia customers.  In its plan, it contended that buying another coal-fired power plant from its parent company was the best option for the customers.  Other parties intervened to argue against it, but the Commission ultimately approved the plan, noting that actually buying the coal-fired plant would necessitate another filing and review by the Commission and parties could argue against it at that time.

However, during the last coal-fired power plant purchase case for Harrison, the company contended that there wasn't time to issue a request for proposals to solicit power supply contracts from other generators that may compete with Harrison to produce the lowest cost for West Virginia ratepayers.  Therefore, Harrison stood alone as the only "solution."

Since the PSC neglected to require the company to solicit competitive bids for supply as part of its IRP, when is an RFP supposed to happen?  It can't happen during the IRP, because it's too early in the process.  But yet it can't happen when supply is needed, because it's too late in the process.

The Staff of the PSC and the West Virginia Consumer Advocate say the time is now.  They have jointly filed a request that the company be required to file RFPs for all future capacity and energy requirements above a certain threshold.  If West Virginians deserve to pay the cheapest prices for the power they need, then the company should be required to solicit competitive bids.

But the company doesn't want to.  FirstEnergy wants to sell its Pleasants power station to West Virginians without any competition.  That's not fair, or in the best interests of West Virginia ratepayers.  FirstEnergy is whining that it shouldn't have to bear the risk of its unprofitable Pleasants plant, because it still has "life left in it."
“Is it frustrating that we’re shutting down tens of thousands of megawatts of generation in our country that’s got life left in it because of the way this market is working?” Jones said. “That is very frustrating to me.”
While the plant may still have physical "life" in it, it doesn't have any economic "life" left.

West Virginia can't afford to bail FirstEnergy out of its bad economic decisions any longer.  Subsidizing FirstEnergy is "frustrating" to West Virginians, too, who sometimes have to make a choice between paying their electric bill and buying food.  Go peddle your lemon somewhere else, FirstEnergy.
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Importing Renewables to West Virginia?  No, thanks!

7/12/2016

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Block Grain Belt Express - Missouri has a brand new petition to let their Public Service Commission know you oppose the building of a 700-mile electric transmission line to export renewables to "states farther east."

Check it out here and add your name as a signer!
I signed it this morning.  Want to know why?
As a resident of a "state farther east" proposed to be the beneficiary of this senseless sacrifice of Missourians, I am not in favor of importing renewables from other states. For years, West Virginians made a sacrifice to export energy to states to the east. Now that the bottom has fallen out of that market, West Virginia is left with nothing to show for its years of sacrifice. We must rebuild our energy economy and that includes building our own renewable energy generators for local use. We cannot afford to ship our energy dollars out of state to import Midwest wind, but must put them to work in our own communities to promote local jobs and economic development. Grain Belt Express is not wanted in Eastern states.
What we need here in West Virginia are local generators, serving local customers, providing local jobs and economic development.  We don't need to ship all our energy dollars to Midwestern states, but invest them at home in our own communities.

Do you want to put your energy dollars to work in your own community?  Or pad the tax coffers of other states and the bank accounts of the foreign investors hoping to strike it rich building unneeded transmission to export renewables from the Midwest?

Those foreign investors and their greenwashing buddies are pretending to represent your interests at the Missouri PSC by purporting that you desperately need and want this energy.  Nothing could be further from the truth, and you need to speak up for yourself now, or risk having foreign investors speak for you!

NOTE:  This is a brand new Block GBE petition.  Even if you signed their petition several years ago, you need to re-sign this new one!  Sign and share it now!
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Potomac Edison Says No One Was Harmed by its Failure to Read Electric Meters in Maryland

6/24/2016

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Wahhhhhhhh.

I could end this blog post there, but I won't.

In May, a Maryland PSC administrative law judge proposed ordering Potomac Edison to change its meter reading frequency to monthly and fined the company a piddly $25K.

That followed an earlier proposed order issued in April, in which the same ALJ said no harm, no foul, and did nothing to punish the company for its transgressions.  The Commission pulled that proposed order and said it was "inadvertently issued."  I guess the judge didn't check with his boss before filing it.  Therefore, the revised order was issued a month later.

Now Potomac Edison and the Maryland Office of People's Counsel are appealing that decision, and basing it on the illegality of the ALJ's sudden change of heart.  The OPC doesn't think monthly meter reading is a solution to a problem that has since solved itself, and that ratepayers shouldn't have to shoulder the financial burden of this company's despicable actions (or lack of action, as the case may be).

You can find all the above filings here.

I guess OPC has a point, why should ratepayers pay to fix Potomac Edison's failure?  That's what happened in West Virginia, where meters are now read every single month.  Buh-bye incorrect estimated bills and huge "catch-up" bills.  Hello wacky bill schedule!  Since a reading must be done before a bill is issued, bills are never issued and due on the same day each month.  This presents a problem for folks who are only paid monthly, such as social security recipients, where they may receive two bills due within the same pay period.

But the anger is nowhere near that displayed across three states in the wake of Allegheny Energy's merger with Ohio dimwits FirstEnergy.  Perhaps if Maryland's Staff and OPC had paid attention to the West Virginia proceeding several years ago, they'd know that the meter reading failure was directly tied to the company's post-merger actions.  FirstEnergy insisted that Allegheny Energy toss out its perfectly good bill estimation methods designed to mesh with its alternate month reading schedule.  It had been working in WV for 30 years.  Instead, FirstEnergy insisted Allegheny adopt its own estimation routine, which was designed for missed reads in a system based on monthly reads.  That's right, while it may have worked fine for FirstEnergy subsidiaries that read meters monthly, it did NOT work for Allegheny's bi-monthly read system.  Combine that with FirstEnergy's "reorganization" of Allegheny's meter reading department and switch to "contract" meter readers who are paid less and must use their own vehicles, instead of a company-maintained motor pool, and disaster ensued. 

Whose fault was this?  FirstEnergy's!!

Only because of the scrutiny received in West Virginia (and to a lesser extent in Maryland, since the MD PSC was quite effective in preventing the customers from being heard during the heat of the moment) did the company take action to fix their mess.  Because Maryland waited so long to actually DO anything, the problems are long since over.

Now Potomac Edison says their actions didn't actually hurt anyone in Maryland because there's nothing in the record.  And there's nothing in the record because the MD PSC cancelled the public hearing it initially scheduled on this matter.  Then shoved the case off to mediation for years.  Then held a hearing.  Then issued two orders FIVE YEARS after the damage was done.  Justice delayed is justice denied, in this instance.

Potomac Edison also whines about the measly $25K fine the ALJ imposed.  $25K probably wouldn't even pay for two seats in the FirstEnergy CEO's special "luxury suite" at FirstEnergy stadium.  And yet this company has the nerve to cry like a baby over $25K.

So, hot potato passes to the MD PSC Commissioners, who seem to be responsible for the amended proposed order, so we'll assume it's to their liking.  Who knows, maybe Chatty Chuck will invite the Commissioners to watch a game in his luxury suite!  Woo Hoo!
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R.I.P. Big Transmission, We Hardly Knew Ye

6/2/2016

1 Comment

 
I'm late for the funeral!  Ran across this article yesterday when searching for something totally unrelated, but it speaks so much truth, I couldn't dismiss it.  Back in September of last year, utility rag Fortnightly ran an article headlined, "The Rise and Fall of Big Transmission:  The alternatives may make more sense."  Author Steve Huntoon chronicles the big transmission building phase that was created by Congressional action to provide incredible financial incentives for Big Transmission.  In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress tasked the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with creating a system to award incentives to transmission builders, such as double digit returns, the ability to collect project costs in rates during construction, guaranteed recovery in the event a Big Transmission project was abandoned, and many more (I'm not going to list them all here because only utility rate geeks would understand them all without lengthy explanation).  Creating incentives to build more transmission was a Congressional knee-jerk to the 2003 northeast blackout.  Nevermind that a complicated, expansive transmission system was to blame for the blackout, industry lobbyists spun the blackout its clients created through mismanagement into a huge financial windfall.  And the Big Transmission building boom began.

Huntoon walks the reader through the bad ideas that sprang from utility greed, analyzes why many of them failed, and applies his analysis to the remaining Big Transmission bad ideas to demonstrate why they, too, must fail.

And he does it in an entertaining and easily understood fashion.  Big Transmission becomes a proper noun, a name for an entity that took on a life of its own for a brief period in utility history.  But, in the end, Big Transmission had to die.
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The author explains six points that make Big Transmission fail:
Big Transmission never did and never will make sense. Let’s look at a half-dozen reasons why: 1) the laws of physics, 2) higher reliability risk, 3) stricter contingency limits, 4) lumpiness and investment risk, 5) rigidity of source and sink, and 6) better alternatives.
 Concise explanation of each point is in the article, so I won't belabor them here.

But the purist in me simply can't overlook a couple of glaring errors.  First, the Figure 2 national transmission overlay map is mislabeled.  Existing and New 765kV transmission have their colors reversed.  The Existing 765 system is red on the map, and the New 765 system is green (the legend in the upper right is incorrect).  It makes a great, big difference when studying the map to figure out which lines are new Big Transmission and which lines are incremental existing builds.  Second, the author places the PATH project on the wrong line in the Figure 1 Project Mountaineer Map.  He says, "PATH was essentially the western half of the #2 project in the overall Project Mountaineer plan."  No, PATH was the western half of the #3 project in the Project Mountaineer map.  PJM's original Project Mountaineer called for a Big Transmission line from the John Amos power station to the Deans substation in New Jersey.  PJM combined several proposals into the Frankenstein monster that became PATH, and then cut it off at Kemptown, with plans to build a separate Big Transmission project from Kemptown to Deans at a later date.

But, other than those two mapping boo-boos, the article gets the demise of the PATH project exactly right.  The demise of PATH has been wrongly portrayed by many people, with claims covering everything from reduced demand to coal plant retirements.  In his note 29, the author correctly notes that the demise of PATH was a combination of factors:
It is difficult to apportion the demise of PATH among reduced load growth, the Mt. Storm-Doubs alternative, new generation, and sophisticated statelevel opposition. However, it is fair to observe that reduced load growth had only postponed PATH in the past (three times). What was different in 2010 was the emergence of the Mt. Storm-Doubs  alternative, and the focus of a state regulator on that alternative.
That's right... every factor, except Mt. Storm-Doubs, simply delayed the PATH project.  Mt. Storm-Doubs, and the "sophisticated statelevel opposition's" overwhelming support of this alternative to change the political climate supporting the PATH project, is what killed PATH.  Better, cheaper alternative that the people support?  It's the winning PATH of least resistance!

The realities of the "need" for PATH, and its opposition, merely delayed the project long enough for Dominion Virginia Power to step onto the stage with its proposed rebuild.  But even that wasn't simply about a better idea... the Mt. Storm Doubs line's existing towers were built out of a certain kind of steel that had not stood the test of time.  The tower bases were deteriorating and patchwork fixes were no longer effective.  The towers needed to be replaced before they started falling down.  And while they were replacing the towers, everything else got an upgrade that increased the line's thermal capacity 65% (allowing it to carry more power).  Dominion smartly took advantage of the PATH debacle to get its line rebuilt with minimal opposition, and even the outright support of affected landowners.

Would this situation repeat itself to kill other Big Transmission proposals?  Probably not.  But it does support the idea that incremental transmission projects and rebuilds are much easier to build than Big Transmission.  So, why does the utility industry continue to propose and/or support Big Transmission?  Because it comes with Big Profits and they're willing to risk protracted planning and permitting processes in order to increase their profits.  It's not about building reliability, economic benefits for consumers, or even "cleaner" power...  and all the risk of Big Transmission ends up on the backs of consumers.  What's not to like for them?  The facts in this article -- Big Transmission must fail.

There's even some hard truth about the last of the Big Transmission projects that have yet to realize they're dead.  Clean Line Energy came up with its idea to build thousands of miles of Big Transmission to ship renewables from coast to coast in 2009, when Big Transmission was in its heyday.  But, unlike utility proposals where risk and cost is shouldered by ratepayers, Clean Line has spent millions of dollars of private investment cash to keep its idea alive.  Once Clean Line gives up, its investors lose everything.  There is no federal guarantee to recover sunk costs on speculative, market based Big Transmission.  And Clean Line, itself, will die along with its projects, and its executives currently living high on the hog of private investor cash, will be in the unemployment line.  This is what keeps Clean Line on life support long after it's been pronounced brain dead.  And here's why Clean Line will never happen:
But certainly when Big Transmission is dependent upon market conditions the lumpiness and risk factors are all the more daunting. Big Transmission somehow needs to bring together generation resources and market demand – to the exclusion of alternatives – to forge a level of commitment that will last for many years. That’s a prerequisite for financing. So the entities at each end need to perceive such a compelling business proposition that they will forego other alternatives and cast their fate with Big Transmission. That’s a tough sell.

FERC requires that utilities interconnect all new generation. So a new generator is assured of being able to interconnect its project to the utility serving the territory it is located in; the issue is solely how much money and time it will take for the interconnection. Given this legally assured ability to access the grid through the resident utility, market-based Big Transmission is effectively competing with that utility and thus must offer substantial value added.
And there is no value added by a Clean Line.  Clean Line stupidly demonstrated just this point to the City of Hannibal, Missouri, earlier this year with its chart of wind options for the city.  The Clean Line prepared (and tweaked) chart showed that wind delivered over the existing incremental transmission system was just as cheap as wind delivered over a "clean" line.

Why would any company buy capacity from a risky new transmission line when existing lines are just as cheap?  This probably explains why Clean Line has no customers.  And without customers, Clean Line's Big Transmission will also fail.
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    About the Author

    Keryn Newman blogs here at StopPATH WV about energy issues, transmission policy, misguided regulation, our greedy energy companies and their corporate spin.
    In 2008, AEP & Allegheny Energy's PATH joint venture used their transmission line routing etch-a-sketch to draw a 765kV line across the street from her house. Oooops! And the rest is history.

    About
    StopPATH Blog

    StopPATH Blog began as a forum for information and opinion about the PATH transmission project.  The PATH project was abandoned in 2012, however, this blog was not.

    StopPATH Blog continues to bring you energy policy news and opinion from a consumer's point of view.  If it's sometimes snarky and oftentimes irreverent, just remember that the truth isn't pretty.  People come here because they want the truth, instead of the usual dreadful lies this industry continues to tell itself.  If you keep reading, I'll keep writing.


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